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Abstract 
This document interprets the Foresight Report Migration and Global Environmental Change (‘the 
Report) for the Middle East and North Africa region.1 The Report examines the influence that 
environmental change (‘EC’) has on five drivers of migration: economic, social, political, 
demographic, and environmental. It emphasises that the primary driver globally is economic, 
implying policy responses focused on decreasing the vulnerability of livelihoods. This 
interpretation summarises and interprets the Report’s findings for the MENA region until end 
2011, and draws a number of key messages. The main drivers of migration are political and 
economic, for instance, not environmental. Many people throughout the region remain 
‘trapped’ by politics or economics, while the possibilities of migration to reduce vulnerability 
are squandered by a system that favours exploitation of the most vulnerable. The primary EC 
threats in the region are increased desiccation and sea-level rise, both of which are expected to 
continue to impact agricultural livelihoods in particular. While EC-influenced migration is 
typically seen as an additional threat, it can also be a force for economic and social 
development in both home and host communities. It is also found that EC or migration policy 
targeting the development of more resilient livelihoods is well-suited to address the concerns 
and leverage the benefits of migration, but will have to confront low economic growth rates, 
uncoordinated governance, and interests vested in the status quo. 
Summary of migration and environmental trends in the MENA region 
The Report divides the world into three ecological zones, of which the ‘dryland’ and ‘coastal’ 
are prominent in MENA. At the time of writing (2011), the main projected EC threats in the 
MENA region are rises in temperature and changes in precipitation patterns, which are 
expected to lead to desiccation more generally; and sea-level rise, resulting in greater saline 
intrusion of groundwater and shifting and more erratic food-growing seasons (see Burke et al 
(2011) and Annex A for a summary of expected changes).  
The biggest impact of EC in MENA is thus expected to be felt through agricultural livelihoods. 
The Report demonstrates how the impact will in turn affect and is being influenced by the 
economic, social, political, demographic and environmental drivers of migration. As quantified 
in Annex B, waves of people flee war or emigrate for better work opportunities within the 
region (e.g. to Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) or North Africa countries), through it (on their 
way to Europe) or well beyond it (e.g. North or South America). The most significant 
migrations in the region are from post-colonial economic migrants from North Africa to 
Europe, and political migrants from the Eastern Mediterranean. So great are the population 
                                            
1 The interpretation was commissioned by Foresight, UK Government Office for Science on behalf of the World 
Bank. It has been reviewed by 4 peers at both organisations, though – along with the other regional interpretations –
never published. It is published (late) here as a DEV Working Paper with the consent of the Government Office for 
Science. As the interpretation is not comprehensive, nuance has in places been passed over by the necessary 
generalisations. Except where otherwise noted, page numbers refer to the Report. Many thanks for discussions and 
interviews to Hammou Laamrani, Guy Jobbins, Michael Talhami, Marwan Owaygen, Neil Adger and Stephen 
Bennett. 
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movements in MENA that it counts 8 of the top 10 countries2 with the highest share of 
international migrants relative to the native population (IOM, 2011: 75). 
Current national and regional policy on migration is generally exploitative, though changes in 
human and labour rights are a step towards a more livelihoods-centred approach. Efforts to 
progress in this direction will face challenges due to poor governance, un-coordinated line 
ministries, and – for several countries – insufficient funds. The recent political upheaval in the 
region adds three more sources of uncertainty to migration (p56), and may eventually reduce 
or compound the vulnerability of ‘trapped’ and exploited populations. 
Summary of the Report’s findings for the MENA region 
The very broad findings of the Report are generally very relevant to the MENA region,3 and 
may be grouped into three categories:  I. Political and economic drivers are particularly 
important drivers in the MENA; II. The conditions under which people are displaced, or choose 
or are forced to stay or to migrate affects whether the outcome is positive or negative; and III. 
States and communities that are wealthy and well-governed are the most resilient. 
I. Political and economic drivers are particularly important drivers in the MENA, 
notably in terms of conflict and agricultural livelihoods. As shown in Figure 1, the Report 
conceptualises EC influencing the five drivers of migration.4 Select evidence for the MENA 
region is provided in Table 1.  
Figure 1. Foresight Report’s conception of the influence of EC on five drivers of migration.  
 
                                            
2 These are Bahrain, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. 
3 The emphasis placed on mountain zones (Section 3.4) will be of interest to policy-makers concerned with the 
fringes of the region (in Iran and Morocco), while the discussion on mega-deltas and low-elevation coastal zones 
(Section 3.2) is more applicable to Asia than MENA. 
4 This builds on conceptual work done by the World Bank MENA office (World Bank, 2010: Fig. 3). 
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The internal and international political strife throughout the region in the last century has led to some of 
the largest and most enduring migrations in the world. This socially or politically-driven ‘rapid 
onset’ migration is typically not influenced directly by environmental change, but can 
contribute to pressure on natural resources such as water (see e.g. Bernauer, Koubil, & 
Böhmelt, 2011), particularly when these are physically scarce or poorly-managed.5 Tensions 
over natural resources may improve or degrade relations between communities and states, 
depending on the power structures and vested interests of the broader political context 
(Hartmann, 2007; Zeitoun & Mirumachi, 2008), and may lead to further migration or trapped 
populations (see e.g. Selby & Hoffman, 2011). The Report does not discuss the merits of food 
trade and virtual water in reducing or compounding regional physical and social scarcity, 
though these are being considered (see e.g. Hoekstra (2010)). 
Table 1 Some evidence of the five drivers of migration in the MENA region.  
Driver Select recent evidence in MENA region 
Economic6 
 Within MENA: Skilled and unskilled labour migrating to GCC countries (i.e. 
Eastern Mediterranean engineers, North African labourers); Rural to Urban 
migration (e.g. into Cairo); 1980s Syrian workers in Lebanon, etc. 
Outside MENA: Skilled and unskilled labour migrating to GCC countries (i.e. British 
nurses, Bangladeshi labourers); 
Migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa migrating to North Africa (e.g. from Ghana); 
Migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa migrating to Europe (via North Africa).  
Social7 
Established inter-generational emigration leads to enduring remittances and social 
interaction (e.g. Lebanon and Egypt amongst top 10 countries for remittances (Table 
4.1)). 
                                            
5 The estimated 2M Iraqi refugees in Damascus in 2003, for example, posed a water-provision problem in the 
already water-strained capital, which is now further strained by the needs of new Syrian migrants from the North 
East following changes in land tenure, water mis-management, and three dry years (2007-2009) (tbc, forthcoming). 
There is also a geopolitical component to this interaction, considering further that the water in question flows from 
Turkey and into Iraq (the Euphrates River).  
6 Characterised as “Imbalances in labour markets and wage differentials at the macro level” (p44). 
7 Characterised as “Access to family, social or other networks facilitates migration by migrants, while limited family 
and other ties also explain a lack of migration by others“ (p44). 
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Driver Select recent evidence in MENA region 
Political8 
International conflict: 1948, 1967 Palestinian refugees to Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and 
outside region; post 1948 Jewish emigration to Israel; 1975 Sahrawi refugees to 
Algeria; 1991 Palestinian and Yemeni displacement from Kuwait; 2003 Iraqi 
refugees to Jordan, Syria, and outside region;  
2011+ Political upheaval: Up to 600,000 migrants in Libya (from Egypt, Bangladesh, 
etc.) had left by June 2011 (IOM 2011: 50)); 2011-2013 Syrian refugees to Jordan, 
Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq, Armenia; 
Repression: Forced settlement of Bedouin (in Syria, Israel); Displacement of Kurds 
and Arabization of Kurdish areas (in Syria, Iraq); displacement of Palestinians and 
settlement of West Bank.  
Demogra-
phic9 
Youth bulge: Current ‘youth bulge’ in MENA (96 M people in 2010 between the ages 
of 20-29, while the largest generation ever born is now entering the work force 
(Fargues, 2008: 3)), many of which are expected to emigrate (see also Burke et al 
(2011: Table 2)) with also induced by differential growth rates between Africa-
MENA-Europe; 
Environ-
mental10 
Coastal degradation (erosion, flooding, salinization of groundwater) affects 
agricultural and urban livelihoods (e.g. Alexandria, Tunis, Tripoli Lebanon) (see 
e.g. El-Batran, 2010); Physical water scarcity (e.g. extended droughts) (Verner, 2011) 
and social water scarcity (water cost, denial, mismanagement) affects agricultural 
livelihoods (e.g. Northeast Syria (2007-2010), West Bank (2011), Southern Iraq (> 
2003) (tbc, forthcoming; World Bank, 2009)). 
Primarily because environmental change is projected to compound human activity-induced 
desiccation, farming families (and the agricultural sector) are deemed to be the most vulnerable. Drops 
in staples production in the MENA region have been estimated by 2050 at about 33% in rice, 
7% in wheat, 8% in Maize and 4% in millet11 (Nelson et al., 2009: Table 3). The reduction in 
yields is expected to induce higher water demand, while higher evapotranspiration rates and 
temperature will lead to increased crop water requirements. The location and extent of the 
resulting economically-driven migration influenced by this slow-onset environmental change 
is difficult to predict, but likely a function of the ability to move and vulnerability of the 
communities in question (see below).  
II. The result of being displaced, or choosing or being forced to stay or to migrate can 
be positive or negative, for both the home and host communities. The Report’s conception of 
                                            
8 Characterised as “Displacement, or forced migration, may be triggered by the breakdown of governance 
structures or the emergence of violent conflict,… [and] conflict and political repression can prevent people from 
leaving, leading to cases of ‘involuntary immobility’ (p45). 
9 “demographic pressures are more likely to influence migration in interaction with other drivers“ (p45) 
10 “a change in ecosystem services directly affects well-being and the demand for migration, … [and] rapid-onset 
extreme environmental events, such as floods …trigger displacement. … “(p45) 
11 The figures compare with estimates of reductions of crop production in Egypt by year 2050: rice - 11%; wheat – 
4.8 to 17.2%; maize – 14 to 19% (Abou Hadid, 2009: Table 1). The drop in production in wheat in MENA is 
considerably greater than the projected global drop (of about 25%). 
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the dynamics of the choice (or lack of it) is provided in Annex C, while the advantages and 
disadvantages in the MENA region are shown in Table 2 and discussed following. 
Table 2 Some outcomes, advantages and disadvantages of migration in the MENA region.  
Outcome Examples of disadvantages and advantages in the MENA region 
Migration 
 
 
Disadvantages: Migration can lead to maladaptation (World Bank, 2010: 4); Brain 
drain (e.g. from Kuwait and GCC - replaced by Asians and Africans) (p60); 
Uncontrolled planning: Urbanisation e.g. in peri-urban areas of Cairo (Goell, El-
Lahham, Hussen, El-Khishin, & Soliman, 2009; Verner, 2011) rapidly increasing in 
wake of 2011 revolution, as farmers convert land to urban to increase value; Internal 
tensions (e.g. farming families leaving Northeast Syria 2007 – 2011), international 
tensions (e.g. Iranian migrants to Iraq); unprotected labour force allows very poor 
treatment of domestic workers and labourers in host countries (e.g. Asian maids in 
Lebanon, GCC countries) (Chalcraft 2011); Repression (e.g. control of Kurdish 
populations (Iraq, Syria, Iran)).  
Advantages: Migration as adaptation (World Bank, 2010: 3); Remittances – estimated 
at USD35.4 billion in 2010 (IOM, 2011: 75); pressure leading to more productive natural 
resource use (Abdelali-Martini et al., 2010); positive social and economic contributions 
to host communities (UNDP, 2009);  
Displace
ment 
Internal tensions / Violations of Human Rights (e.g. development-induced displacement 
(as in forced settlement of Bedouin, Ma’dan, Kurds in Syria)); Operational challenges 
for those mandated to manage displaced peoples (UNHCR, ICRC etc.); International 
conflict (e.g. .refugees (see Table 1) in Syria, Jordan, 2011);  Migrant workers fleeing 
violence in Libya, 2011 (from Egypt or Asia); etc. 
Stay - 
trapped 
 
Politically trapped – people lacking the political status that  would permit emigration 
(e.g. ‘unpapered’ refugee population who have lost or never had passports, or 
children of women who are disallowed from passing their citizenship on and have 
difficulty gaining access to most countries (e.g. Sahrawi (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2011), 
GCC, Lebanon); vulnerable populations hostage to geopolitics (e.g. Palestinians in 
Gaza).  
Economically trapped12 – people prevented from emigration due to lack of financial 
capital (p105) (e.g. street workers in Cairo, Rabat, Baghdad, Tehran).  
The Report builds on previous work (e.g. Mcleman, 2011; UNDP, 2009) to challenge negative 
misconceptions about migration and development, and programmes designed to avoid it 
outright. Whether migration is positive or negative for the migrants and host communities 
depends very much on the assests of the communities, and on the conditions of 
displacement and arrival. ‘Portable’ assets can be of particular positive use; education opens 
up opportunities abroad, for instance Indeed, one of the most striking features from Table 2 is 
the positive aspect of remittances. The economic gain they provide for the home country is 
significant in Yemen (Joseph & Wodon, 2010), estimated at 10% of the GDP for Morocco, 19% 
for Jordan, 25% for Lebanon, and 30% for the occupied Palestinian territory (Gemenne, 2010), 
and up to 50% of households with migrants in Syria (Abdelali-Martini et al., 2010). On the 
                                            
12 This category is also called “immobile” in the Report (see p12).  
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other hand, forced migration (or displacement or stationarity) can and has caused serious 
tensions resulting in violent conflict at the local and national level (e.g. political organisation of 
Palestinian refugees in Jordan (1970s) and Lebanon (1980s)). Likewise, significant reliance on 
external workers (as in Saudi Arabia, where foreign workers outnumber nationals (IOM, 2011: 
76) can render both a wealthy country and migrant communities therein particularly 
vulnerable to the wraths of war – as occurred with the expulsion of skilled Arab migrants from 
Kuwait in 1990.  
III. States and communities that are wealthy and well-governed are the most 
resilient. The ability of governments to develop and implement reactionary or strategic policy 
to migration challenges is seen to be very much a function of their levels of governance and of 
wealth (see p18 and WDR (2010)). Timely construction of flood defences and adaptation 
planning or implementing wide-ranging shifts in cropping patterns requires funds and know-
how, after all. Successful implementation of such policy would also require considerable intra-
governmental coordination, as well as the regulated involvement of the private sector and civil 
society. In the MENA region, effective governance and wealth are very unevenly distributed, 
as the plot of Figure 2 shows.  
Figure 2 Rough indicative plot of MENA countries in 2012 against four plausible future 
scenarios in dryland regions, as a function of global growth vs. governance (adapted from 
Figure 3.4 of Report).  
 
Livelihood, environmental or migration policy in most MENA countries is driven from the top, 
with little involvement of civil society and a blurring of politics with the private sector. This 
model of governance can be very efficient when there is buy-in from the highest level, as in the 
2010-2020 Green Morocco Plan (KoM, 2009) which is supported and driven by the Royal 
Palace. Otherwise it is restrictive, with ministries acting independently, and unable to reflect 
the inter-dependence of migration drivers or lacking the strategic vision to deal with the 
9 
projected influence of EC. Coastal management is the responsibility of the national government 
in some North African countries (e.g. in Tunisia – ‘Agence pour la protection et amelioration 
du litoral’), but is elsewhere left to the affected communities themselves (for instance in Egypt, 
where some of the new planned cities have been built on parts of the Nile Delta that are 
already or soon to be flooded). 
The Report emphasises that wealth matters also for individuals and communities. The most vulnerable 
communities within the most vulnerable countries are expected to bear the brunt of the lack of 
coherent policy and action on EC and migration. Wealth and vulnerability are directly related 
to the three potential migration outcomes (where ‘wealth’ includes also political and social 
capital (i.e. protection)). As Figure 3 shows, communities with great social, political and 
economic capital have mobility options available to them, while the most vulnerable can be 
‘trapped’. 13 
Figure 3 Schematic representation of the relation between vulnerability, ability to move, and 
wealth (in terms of social, economic and political capital), plotted with an indicative selection 
of MENA communities (adapted from Figure 3.20 of Report). 
 
                                            
13 “Vulnerability will be increased if migration occurs in unplanned ways, or migrants end up in areas of high 
environmental risk, such as low-lying urban areas in mega-deltas or slums in water insecure expanding cities… 
poorer households are likely to be ‘trapped’ in circumstances where they are at once more vulnerable to 
environmental change and less able to move away from it “ (p67). 
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Emphasising the lack of advantages that may come from trapped populations, the Report 
discusses and proposes a number of guidelines for policy. The development of regional 
migration policy is hampered, however, by the variety in quality of national governance and 
wealth, as we will see.  
Relevant local, national and regional policy in MENA 
The full range of general policy conclusions from the Report is provided in Annex D, while 
Table 3 presents some of this policy at different levels of governance in the MENA region, 
which are summarised and discussed following. These include National migration policy 
within MENA countries and in the region as a whole is poorly developed;Local policy 
responses are currently far from the ideal sought; EU policies place a burden on asylum-
seekers, and fail to take advantage of the positive aspects of migration; Progressive policy in 
the MENA region will be heavily tested by the poor governance existing in many countries; 
and ‘Trapped’ communities that are unable to migrate should be a particular policy concern. 
Table 3  Non-comprehensive list of local, national, and regional policy related to migration 
in the MENA region, 2012. 
i - projects which look to utilise remittances / diasporas for adapting to environmental change in the sending area; ii - projects 
which look to make migration a more positive experience for migrants through targeted education schemes; or supply of 
basic services, etc.; ii - projects which look to facilitate migration through enabling mobility – e.g. provision of national 
insurance cards which make it easier to claim benefits anywhere in a country; iv - regional migration schemes or initiatives – 
e.g. ECOWAS free movement; v - ‘urbanisation as adaptation’; vi – forced settlement policy; vii - related environmental 
policy. 
GCC + Yemen  
Bahrain ii – replacement of Kafala system (ILO, 2011a: 17); 
Kuwait 
ii – replacement of Kafala system (ILO, 2011a: 17); ii – MOU signed with Indonesia for 
increased protection of migrant workers (IOM, 2011: 70); 
Oman ii – replacement of Kafala system (ILO, 2011a: 17); 
Qatar 
ii – MOU signed with Indonesia for increased protection of migrant workers (IOM 
2011: 70); 
S.Arabia 
vii - shift from emphasis on local food production (e.g. halting wheat production by 
2016 (El Houry, 2011)); reforms to labour policy in relation to migrants (e.g. relaxed 
restrictions on employment); 
UAE 
ii – MOU signed with Indonesia for increased protection of migrant workers (IOM 
2011: 70) (but is not challenging the Kafala system (IOM 2011: 76)); 
Yemen 
ii – UNHCR management of camps of migrants from Horn of Africa or (government 
management of IDP centres); vii – informal shift in water use from staples to cash 
crops, with increased value of water (e.g. qat); 
Eastern MENA 
Jordan 
Amman - Informal absorption of 1M refugees from Iraq (2003+) also leads to economic 
gains from high concentration of international organisations, and US foreign 
assistance); ii – 2009 adoption of a national strategy to combat human trafficking (ILO, 
2011a); ii – MOU signed with Indonesia for increased protection of migrant workers 
(IOM 2011: 70); vii – study of feasibility of the Red Sea – Dead Sea Canal, or JRSP; 
development of the Disi Aquifer both for water for Amman, and local use (and 
emigration) to desert; 
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Lebanon 
ii - Establishment of National Steering Committee on Migrant Women Domestic 
Workers 2005 (ILO 2011); ii – MOU signed with Indonesia for increased protection of 
migrant workers (IOM 2011: 70); ii – amendments of labour law restricting employment 
rights to Palestinian refugees (2005) (ILO 2010: 15); ii – informal management of Syrian 
refugees (2012) considered ‘visitors’ (as in Turkey), thus withheld refugee status; ad-hoc 
management of labourers (mainly from Syria and from Sudan, Egypt, SSA); 
Iraq v - Attempts to re-settle the Iraqi marshlands (2004+); ad-hoc management of Iranian 
migrants (social (religious) and economic);  
Iran 
ii – government management of Afghani or Pakistani (Baluchistan) refugees (1990s + ); 
ii- informal absorptions of Azeri refugees (1988 +); vii – national plans for food self-
sufficiency 
Israel 
vi - Forced settlement of Bedu e.g. in Galilee and Negev (Development-induced 
displacement [ref]) ; ii – Law of Return encouraging migration of Jewish people to 
Israel; Citizenship and Entry to Israel Law (2005) limiting Palestinian citizenship rights, 
etc.; Population transfer through Israeli settlement of West Bank;  vii – study of 
feasibility of the Red Sea – Dead Sea Canal; Ad-hoc management of migrants from 
Sudan (2007 +); 
oPt 
vi – Jordan Valley Master Plan (2004) to absorb expected Palestinian refugees; 
Syria 
Damascus - Informal absorption of 1M refugees from Iraq (2003+); vi - Forced settlement 
of Bedu e.g. around Palmyra (Chatty, 2010); ii – UNHCR management of camps of Iraqi 
refugees on Syria-Iraq border (2003); vii - Shift from policy towards food self-
sufficiency away from cotton towards production of staple foods (~2005-2009); 
North Africa 
Algeria 
i - Informal sending of remittances (primarily from France) and important inter-
generational international links (see e.g. Fargues (2004)); ii – 2008 Adoption of law on 
entry, treatment and displacement of irregular migrants (Labdelaoui, 2008); changes to 
nationality laws for diaspora (Bouklia-Hassane, 2012); 
Egypt 
v - Vision Egypt 2030 for new cities (Goell et al., 2009; see also World Bank, 2008): 
construction of 22 new cities in desert areas e.g. Toshka, Nasr City, etc.; Ad-hoc 
management of migrants from Sudan, sub-Saharan Africa; 
Libya 
Ad-hoc management of migrants (<2011) from sub-Saharan Africa, Egypt, etc. 
(professionals, skilled and unskilled labour) (ILO, 2010);  
Morocc
o 
i - Informal sending of remittances (primarily from France) and important inter-
generational international links (see e.g. Fargues (2004)); iii - Green Morocco Plan (2010-
2020) designed to prevent “massive rural-urban migration” (KoM, 2010); iii - 
Consideration of crop insurance scheme for larger farmers, and application to smaller 
farmers;  
Tunisia 
i - Informal sending of remittances (primarily from France) and important inter-
generational international links (see e.g. Fargues (2004)); iii - Dedicated government 
agency for coastal issues (Agence pour le protection et amelioration du littoral (APAL)) 
to deal with urban challenges (e.g. flooding in Tunis); 
Wester
n 
Sahara 
ii - Sahrawi refugees in Algeria and elsewhere – politically and economically trapped 
populations;  
Regional/International 
Arab 
League 
Establishment of Anti-Human trafficking Unit (Jan 2011); i) ii) iii) - Brasilia Declaration 
of the South American and Arab Countries Summit (SAACS, 2005: Clause 12.3); 
Euro-
Africa 
iii and iv - Rabat Plan of Action of the Euro-African Ministerial Conference on 
Migration and Development 2006 between EU and African states regarding 
12 
professional capacity-building (RAP, 2006); 
EU 
iv - Fortress Europe – and “externalisation of migration controls” beyond EU, esp. to 
North Africa (see discussion below); 
Internat
-ional14 
International conventions e.g. IASC, UNRWA, Geneva Refugee Convention 1951 and 
1967 (see discussion below); Actors: UNHCR, UNRWA, ICRC, etc. World Bank - 
Repatriation and Livelihood Restoration for Migrant Workers project;  
 
National: Migration-environment issues are very context-specific, and as seen in Table 3, each 
country has its own particular migration issues and policy responses. Government and 
governance in several MENA countries appears to be shifting, following the political 
upheavals of 2011. The governments of Oman, Jordan and Morocco, for example, are 
reforming including in areas related to water use, food production, and rural-urban migration. 
The majority of other policy responses in Table 3 deal with improving conditions for refugees 
and migrant workers, in response to criticism of widespread abuses of human rights and 
labour laws. These exist alongside practice of development-induced displacement of Bedu 
tribes, discriminatory migration policy (e.g. based on religion or ethnicity), and refusal of 
national or refugee status to migrants. The influence of EC on such movements – primarily 
through changes in agricultural livelihoods – is expected to lead to ever-greater social tensions.   
While further research is underway in Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, Syria and Yemen,15 it may be 
safe to generalise that – as everywhere – coordinated policy responses from different ministries 
required to deal with the interacting drivers of migration is absent. On the whole, national 
migration policy within MENA countries and in the region as a whole is poorly developed, 
meaning that both the positive aspects of portable capital (education and remittances, for 
instance) are under-developed, and that migrant workers and refugees remain vulnerable and 
exploited. 
Local: With urban services strained in most MENA cities, they may be prone to what the 
Report calls “urbanisation without growth” (p164). Indeed, the “double jeopardy future” (p10) 
of increased migration and exposure to risks from environmental change already threatens 
Alexandria, Tunis, and in particular Cairo (Report Figure 7.1). Some MENA countries appear 
to be engaging in what the Report calls ‘urbanisation as adaptation’.16 The planned and 
ongoing construction of new cities especially in Egypt (with the flailing Vision Egypt 2030 
(CARE, 2009)) is a prime example, but the practice is evident also in Israel (settlements in the 
West Bank –a prime driver of conflict), and in Iraq, through re-settlement of the marshes of the 
Ma’dan people (see Mcleman, 2011: S115). Attempts to reverse urban-rural migration have 
been attempted in Morocco with unintended environmental consequences (e.g. depletion of 
the groundwater aquifer (IDRC CC 2011)). Informal settlements are just as pervasive and 
                                            
14 Global policy developments are tracked in IOM 2011 (Chapter 2), including the Global Forum on Migration and 
Development, Regional consultative processes on migration (RCPs), and an interesting discussion on ‘Emerging 
Policy Space’.  
15  By The World Bank, AFD and RAND corporation (Grant, 2010). 
16 p180 - “development of new secondary cities must not be ruled out”. 
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problematic throughout the region: apart from the expected tensions generated by intrusion, 
local vulnerable communities often resent the assistance provided to the populations they are 
obliged to host or live alongside (e.g. SSA refugees in Yemen, Iraqi refugees in Syria (see e.g. 
AFED (2012)). Local policy responses are currently far from the ideal recommended by 
Chapter 9 of the Report.  
Regional/international: The most important regional migration policy relevant to MENA is 
driven from outside it by the EU. Tightening of the EU’s borders (the beginning of the creation 
of ‘Fortress Europe’) in the 1990s soon moved to the “externalisation of migration controls” 
(Bilgic, 2011: 5). According to de Haas, this has “caused a diversification of trans-Saharan 
migration routes and Mediterranean crossing points” (de Haas, 2011: 3), thus shifting 
migration routes from mainly Algeria and Libya to most North African countries.17 EU policies 
have been heavily criticised for the burden they place on asylum-seekers, and for taking no 
advantage of the positive aspects of migration18 (see e.g. IOM 2010:50). The EU policy is also 
seen as conflicting, given EU’s ageing and shrinking population, and MENA’s ‘youth bulge’ 
(Gemenne, 2010).  
The Report also details the international governance structure, which includes international 
conventions such as the 1951 and 1967 Geneva Refugee Convention (p151) and the UN Inter 
Agency Standing Committee (p154). These are meted out between migration and labour-
specific agencies such as the UNHCR, IOM, ILO and UNRWA (see de Hey, 2010; IALIIS, 2011). 
Several of the international agencies involved in this governance do recognise the positive 
aspects of migration (points i) ii) and iii)), and have their own policy on migration (the World 
Bank, for example, has set up set up in Bangladesh in part to help with exodus of refugees 
from Libya (IOM 2011:52)). The Report discusses policy extensively, and readers are 
encouraged to consider the many recommendations from Chapter 9 and in Laczko (2010). Such 
policy in the MENA region will be heavily tested by the poor governance existing in many 
countries (refer back to Figure 2), however, and suggestions that governments should take up 
e.g. Guiding Principles to IDPs (p153) may be more relevant to well-governed states than those 
to the target vulnerable communities on the left-hand side of Figures 2 and 3.  
Constrained Migration: ‘Trapped’ communities that are prevented from migration are of 
particular concern in the Report. Referring back to Figure 3, this is the case for most of the 
entire population of Gaza (whose exits face obstacles from Israeli, Egyptian and potential host-
country administrations), domestic workers and labourers in the GCC countries, un-papered 
migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in North Africa, and (often rural) inhabitants throughout the 
region lacking or denied the financial and legal opportunities. The drivers behind such 
                                            
17 The political economy of shifting migration routes (and policy, as well as economic and political drivers of 
migration around the Mediterranean are clearly elucidated in de Haas (2011), while IOM (2008) focuses on 
migration between sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa and Europe. 
18 An example of softer measures being introduced is the 2006 Rabat Plan of Action (RAP, 2006) and the 
development of “Migration Toolkit” developed for Mali and Senegal meant to deal with migration to Spain via 
Morocco (ILO, 2011b: 116).  
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restrictions are clearly political and social, which the Report addresses only indirectly through 
its emphasis on “‘inclusive and connected’ approach to governance” (p193). 
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Annex A – Summary of Environmental Change projections in MENA 
Summary of climate change projections for temperature and precipitation in the MENA region. 
Except where stated otherwise, results are based on IPCC (2007a, 2007b) (Zeitoun, Cascao, 
England, & Hodbod, 2012). 
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Mean temperatures are projected to increase by 
0.5 to 1.5°C for the period 2020-2029, and by 
2.5°C to 5.5°C for the end of the century (2090-
2099). 
Annual precipitation projected to decrease generally 
in the region. The IPCC AR4 multi climate model 
average change is -12% by 2080-2099 for the 
Southern Mediterranean region. 
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Warming is very likely (e.g. >90% confidence) to 
be larger than the global annual mean warming 
throughout the continent and in all seasons, 
with drier subtropical regions warming more 
than the humid tropics.  
Models predict that the median temperature 
increase lies between 3°C and 4°C, roughly 1.5 
times the global mean response.  
Annual precipitation is likely (>80 to 90% confidence 
to decrease in much of Mediterranean Africa and 
the northern Sahara, with a greater likelihood of 
decreasing precipitation as the Mediterranean coast 
is approached.  
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Warming over the 21st century will be larger 
than global annual mean warming – between 
2.2-5.1 °C according to an optimistic emissions 
scenario (Scenario A1B).  
Recent runs of the ECHAM4 and HadCM3 
global circulation models under the B2 
emissions scenario confirm substantial 
temperature rises of up to 4°C for the eastern 
Mediterranean region (Hertig and Jacobeit 
2007). 
Regional climate change simulations 
undertaken by different models have delivered 
a surprisingly consistent account of climate 
change over the Mediterranean. Increases in 
inter-annual variability of temperatures, along, 
with mean warming, are also forecast to lead to 
a greater number of high temperature events 
(Giorgi and Lionello 2007). 
Projected increase of 2.5-3.7C in summer and 
2.0-3.1C in winter (Brown & Crawford, 2009) 
1.5 °C increase in temperature is expected to 
shift the Mediterranean climate zone 300-500km 
northwards, increasing aridity (Brown & 
Crawford, 2009). 
Annual precipitation is deemed very likely (e.g. >90% 
chance) to decrease in the eastern Mediterranean – 
decreasing 10% by 2020 and 20% by 2050 with an 
increased risk of summer drought.  
The annual number of precipitation days is very 
likely to decrease in the Mediterranean area. Risk of 
summer drought is likely to increase in the 
Mediterranean area. The spatial distribution and 
timing of precipitation is predicted to increase. 
Annual precipitation rates are deemed likely to fall 
in the eastern Mediterranean – decreasing 10% by 
2020 and 20% by 2050 – with an increased risk of 
summer drought. with global warming (Khatib, 
Gernstengarbe, & Haj-Daoud, 2008).  
Decreasing winter participation by 2100 of up to 
35% compared to late twentieth century timelines. 
The GLOWA MM5 run between 1958-1996 and 
2007-2045 forecasts a mid-century decrease in 
precipitation by 100 to 200mm in the northern oPt 
(above 31ºN) and a shift in the precipitation season 
into March and April (Khatib et al., 2008).  
Significant rainfall declines in the wet (winter) 
season (-9%) outweighing slight increases in drier 
summer (+29%) in the Levant (Brown & Crawford, 
2009). 
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According to the country’s First National 
Communications to the UNFCCC, Yemen’s 
climate is projected to change significantly over 
the next 50 years. Temperature across the 
country is expected to rise between 1.4 and 2.8 
degrees Celsius by 2050. Yemen NAPA, 2008 
Precipitation and cloud cover patterns are more 
uncertain – depending on the GCM, rainfall is 
projected to decrease by about 24% or increase by 
about 35%. Follow-up regional climatic modelling 
indicates that rainfall is expected to decrease across 
the northern regions, leading to increased pressures 
on the country’s delicate agriculture and water 
resources sectors. Yemen NAPA, 2008 
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Annex B – Migration patterns in MENA 
Selected migration statistics in the MENA region – from Fargues (2008) (see also Fargues (2004) 
and de Haas (2011)).  
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Annex C - Conceptualising EC-influenced migration 
From the 2011 Foresight 2011 Migration and Global Environmental Change report. 
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Annex D - Synthesis of the Foresight report ‘Migration and Climate 
Change’ 
1. Scope 
The Foresight “Migration and Global Environmental Change” report aims to use the best 
available science and evidence to develop a vision for how human population movements 
across the world could be affected by global environmental changes between now and 2060, 
with a focus on the diverse challenges and opportunities for migrants, populations and policy 
makers in originating and receiving regions. 
The report considers ‘migration’ to include both internal and international migration, and also 
considers issues related to ‘displacement’ (internal and cross-boundary).  Further definitions are 
found in Box 1.7 of the final report19. 
Environmental change is defined as changes in the physical and biogeochemical environment, 
over a large scale, either caused naturally or influenced by human activities.  The most 
significant global environmental changes include climate change, widespread land degradation 
and the degradation of coastal and marine ecosystems.  Important dimensions include: 
 a rise in sea level 
 a change in tropical storm and cyclone frequency or intensity 
 changes in rainfall regimes 
 increases in temperature 
 changes in atmospheric chemistry 
 melting of mountain glaciers 
 land degradation  
 coastal and marine ecosystem degradation (see p38 and boxes 2.3 and 2.4) 
The time horizon for the report’s analysis is 2060, with an additional focus on how issues 
develop by 2030.  
 
2. Summary of key conclusions from Foresight report 
a. Influence of environmental change on drivers of migration. The decision to migrate is influenced 
by five broad categories of ‘driver’. These drivers are set out at the vertices of the pentagon in Figure 
1.3. Environmental change will influence migration outcomes through affecting existing drivers of 
migration. This influence is likely to be most pronounced for economic, environmental and, to a 
lesser degree, political drivers.  Environmental change will affect these drivers by impacting, for 
                                            
19 All page references are to the final report. 
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example, rural wages, agricultural prices, exposure to hazard and provisioning ecosystems.   See 
Section 1.2.2 and Chapter 2. 
b. The complex interactions of drivers can lead to different outcomes, which include migration and 
displacement. These movements will in turn differ depending upon the political and socio-economic 
context, and may vary in their permanence, duration, novelty, speed, distance, and whether they are 
cross-border or internal. The variations in these types of movement will pose different policy 
challenges.  See Section 1.2.3, Chapter 3 and Sections 4.1-4.5. 
c. Movement towards vulnerable areas: powerful economic, political and social drivers mean that 
some types of migration are likely to continue regardless of environmental change. Indeed, people 
are as likely to migrate to places of environmental vulnerability as from these places. For example, 
compared to 2000, there may be between 114 and 192 million additional people living in floodplains 
in urban areas in Africa and Asia by 2060, in alternative scenarios of the future. This will pose a range 
of challenges to policy makers.  See Sections 3.3 and 4.2. 
d. The implications of immobility: Migration is costly, and with environmental conditions such as 
drought and flooding eroding people’s livelihoods, migration – particularly over long distances – 
may be less possible in some situations. This creates high risk conditions. In the decades ahead, 
millions of people will be unable to move away from locations in which they are extremely 
vulnerable to environmental change. They will be ‘trapped’ in those vulnerable areas, particularly in 
low-income countries. In some cases people may seemingly be choosing to stay (rather than being 
forced to).  This may be a positive outcome and the circumstances which enable it should be 
considered; but it should also be noted there could be public policy issues related to people staying in 
dangerous environments, and a seemingly voluntary decision to stay may actually be compromised 
by socio-political circumstances such as land tenure issues or social networks.  See Box 1.3, Chapter 3 
and Sections 4.6-4.7. 
 
3. Summary of Foresight policy conclusions 
a. A key priority should be an increased focus on urban policy in the context of rural-urban 
migration and increased risks from environmental change (Sections 7.3, 8.4). Cities are 
growing through natural population growth and increased rural–urban migration.  Cities are 
extremely vulnerable to future environmental change, especially those in drylands, low-
elevation coastal zones or mountain regions.  Migrants are particularly vulnerable, as they 
tend to live in high-density settlements in areas prone to environmental risks, and may not 
have the human, social or financial capital to protect themselves from these risks.  
Implications for policy include: 
 The need to plan for environmental change in expanding cities, including water 
availability and quality, long term land loss, more frequent hazards, waste, mobility 
and congestion; 
 Urban planning and policies specifically focused on the welfare of new migrants are 
required, including in regards to informal settlements and migrant rights in planning 
processes;  
 National and sub-national planners may need to take a more strategic and long-term 
approach to city planning which recognises future changes in environmental risks and 
23 
the likelihood of continuing rural–urban migration, and potentially plans for new 
settlements. 
b. A key priority is that adaptation policy, planning and funding should recognise the 
positive and negative impacts that migration can have on adaptive capacity and resilience 
(Sections 6.4, 8.4, 8.5).  Policies are being enacted by local, national and international 
governments to increase resilience and facilitate adaptation to environmental change.  It is 
important that such policies are not developed in isolation of future migration patterns.  
Some migration may negatively impact a community’s adaptive capacity.  However, it is 
often overlooked that migration can deliver benefits to help individuals, households and 
communities adapt to environmental change; e.g. through diversifying income streams or 
financial / social remittances. Examples of adaptation projects which have migration at their 
centre could include: 
 projects which look to utilise remittances / diasporas for adapting to environmental 
change in the sending area; 
 projects which look to make migration a more positive experience for migrants through 
targeted education schemes; 
 projects which look to facilitate migration through enabling mobility – e.g. provision of 
national insurance cards which make it easier to claim benefits anywhere in a country 
 regional migration schemes or initiatives – e.g. ECOWAS free movement; 
Policies may not explicitly aim to ensure migration contributes to adaptation, but may in 
effect achieve this – e.g. policies which look to harness migration for development.  Given the 
strong positive correlation between development and adaptive capacity, these are important 
and relevant.  
c. Preventing or constraining migration is not a ‘no risk’ option. Doing so may lead to 
increased impoverishment, displacement and irregular migration in many settings, 
particularly in low elevation coastal zones, drylands and mountain regions.  Policies may be 
explicitly conceived to reduce (internal or international) migration, or may de facto do so.  The 
latter may include for example social protection schemes which only provide for people in 
the area of their birth, or policies which discriminate against migrants.  Indeed even some 
well-intentioned development spending could in effect result in more people being trapped 
in areas where they will, in the long run, become increasingly vulnerable (p111). 
d. The Foresight policy framework: Figure 5.2 provides an overview of the range of policies 
that can be considered relevant for future migration in the context of global environmental 
change.  Some policies may be more appropriate than others at any given point (indeed it is 
argued in the report that policies to limit or slow environmental change are unlikely to 
impact migration over the shorter term (Section 6.2), that a global protocol on ‘environmental 
migrants’ is unlikely to be successful (Section 7.2), and that policies to relocate communities 
should only be considered last the last resort (Section 8.3)). 
 
